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Abstract 
 
Disclosure of conflict of interest is currently seen as an effective tool for reducing threats to 
auditor independence. Cain, Loewenstein, and Moore (2005) provide evidence for perverse 
effects of disclosing conflict of interest. Using a controlled laboratory experiment, we 
replicate their finding that such a disclosure can cause an impairment of auditor independence.  
However, as subjects gain experience we find that these results revert and auditors give less 
biased advice. Our results imply that the perverse effects noted in the literature might be an 
artifact of an environment with inexperienced subjects and of less relevance for the audit 
environment where main actors are experienced. To the contrary, disclosure of conflict of 
interest can even improve auditor independence by fostering fairness. Furthermore, we find 
that disclosure of conflict of interests disturbs reputation building. 
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1. Introduction 
Disclosure of fees paid to auditors is mandatory in the US since February 2001 (SEC, 
2000) and will be mandatory in all countries of the EU from 2008 on (EU, 2006). The aim is 
to ameliorate the potential negative effects of high audit and especially nonaudit fees on 
auditor independence. Empirical evidence on the effects of high fees on auditor independence 
are mixed (e.g. Frankel, Johnson and Nelson, 2002; Ashbaugh, LaFond and Mayhew, 2003), 
while some evidence exists that it lowers the perceived auditor independence (e.g. Brandon, 
Crabtree and Maher, 2004; Mishra, Raghunandan and Rama, 2005; Krishnan, Sami and 
Zhang, 2005). Disclosure is considered by legislators as a solution as it presumably bears little 
costs and has the potential benefit of better informed decision making by investors (SEC, 
2000; SEC, 2003a). This intuition is well described by the famous quote of the US judge 
Brandeis that “sunlight is the best disinfectant” (Brandeis, 1967). 
However, disclosing the conflict of interest of auditors by disclosing their fees might 
be problematic if it sends wrong signals to investors. Investors could falsely believe that 
auditor independence is impaired by high fees even if it is not. Such false beliefs might be 
even relevant for markets as experimental evidence suggest that they are very persistent 
(Dopuch, King and Schwartz, 2003). 
Conflict of interest is a common phenomenon in professional advisor-client 
relationships. For example, financial analysts may face the conflict between following their 
professional obligation to express their personal view about stocks and following their 
personal interest by issuing favorable analysis of client companies. Therefore analysts are 
required to disclose direct or indirect compensations relating to specific recommendations 
(SEC, 2003b). Other examples include physicians receiving presents from pharmaceutical 
companies (Kassirer, 2001), researchers receiving funds (Wagner and Michaels, 2004), real 
estate agents selling houses too cheap and too fast (Levitt and Syverson, 2005), and insurance 
agents or salesmen receiving commissions (Shapiro, 2003). More generally, the theory of 
conflicts of interest can also be applied to general economic questions like the behavior of 
competitors in oligopoly markets (Crawford and Sobel, 1982). 
Cain, Loewenstein and Moore (2005) (hereinafter called CLM) provide experimental 
evidence that disclosing conflict of interest might have perverse effects even if it signals the 
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correct level of auditor independence to investors.1 They find that auditors impair their 
independence to a higher degree when their conflict of interest is disclosed. According to 
them, this change in the behavior of auditors might be on the one hand of strategic nature as 
auditors might accept even more biased financial reports in order to counteract skepticism by 
the investors who are informed about potential threats to independence. On the other hand 
auditors might feel morally licensed to comprise their independence if investors are informed 
about the incentives of the auditor. This change in the behavior of auditors is not fully 
anticipated by investors. With the disclosure of conflict of interest, investors are therefore 
worse off in the setting of CLM. 
We set up an experiment to test for these potential perverse effects of disclosure of 
conflict of interest. We reduce the complexity of the experiment designed by CLM to 
construct a more controlled environment. In our setting, investors have the task to estimate the 
randomly drawn, uniformly distributed values of assets. Investors are paid based on the 
accuracy of their estimates. They receive information about the value of assets from a better-
informed auditor. This shall compare to a situation where the auditor provides information to 
investors by certifying financial statements. Auditors are in our experiment provided with 
incentives to send biased information to the investor as the payoffs of auditors rise with 
higher estimates of the investors. Auditors have therefore a strong incentive to impair their 
independence. As an experimental treatment, the disclosure of conflict of interest is 
manipulated: Investors are either informed about the incentives of the auditors or receive no 
information thereof. 
We extend the experiment of CLM by testing for the influence of experience and 
reputation, two factors which are often considered to be the main characteristics of the 
auditing environment (Chaney and Philipich, 2002; Wilson Jr. and Grimlund, 1990; Bonner 
and Lewis, 1990). We introduce experience by having the subjects performing the task over 
nine periods and providing them with detailed feedback after each period. We investigate 
reputation by manipulating the way auditors and investors interact: In the experience 
condition, each auditor interacts with a different investor in each period, whereas in the 
reputation condition each auditor interacts with the same investor over all periods.  
                                                 
1 We denote the better informed party who sends information as “auditor” and the worse informed party who 
receives the information as “investor”. In our instructions we labelled auditors as “type A” and investors as “type 
B”. CLM use instead the denotations “advisor” and “estimator”, Crawford  and Sobel (1982) use the denotations 
“sender” and “receiver”.  
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We derive our hypothesis for the different settings by considering the psychological 
effects found to be of relevance in that setting by CLM. We further draw from conventional 
economic analysis of auditor independence which generally assumes that incentives of 
auditors to impair their independence are not disclosed (Magee and Tseng, 1990). We 
complement this analysis by considering economic analysis of sender-receiver games where 
incentives of both players are common knowledge (Crawford and Sobel, 1982). Fairness 
effects found to be important by the research strand of experimental economics are also 
considered (Güth, Huck and Ockenfels, 1996). 
We contribute to experimental economics research on auditor independence 
(Schatzberg, 1990; Dopuch and King, 1991; Schatzberg and Sevcik, 1994; Calegari, 
Schatzberg and Sevcik, 1998; Dopuch, King and Schwartz, 2001). More specifically we 
connect to the research of Dopuch, King and Schwartz (2003) and Davis and Hollie (2005). 
They test for the effect of disclosure of disclosing fees on the efficiency of decision-making 
of investors. We also research investors’ behavior, but test additionally for add to their 
research by testing for the effects of disclosure of disclosing fees on auditor independence by 
letting investors interact with human auditors instead of robot auditors as in the earlier 
studies. We are not aware of any study in the accounting literature who has examined 
experimentally this effect yet. 
On the other hand, we contribute to the literature on reputation formation of auditors 
(King, 1996; Mayhew, 2001; Mayhew, Schatzberg and Sevcik, 2001) as we examine 
disclosure of conflict of interest as a potential influencing factor. 
We use a stylized experimental design in order to derive policy implication on the 
question of the economic usefulness of mandating a disclosure of auditors’ fees (Kachelmeier 
and King, 2002). Archival testing of the effects on disclosing fees on auditor independence is 
problematic as auditors’ fees are very difficult to obtain in situations where fees are not 
disclosed, but should compulsorily be considered as an influencing factor (DeAngelo, 1981; 
Frankel, Johnson and Nelson, 2002; Brandon, Crabtree and Maher, 2004). The stylized 
experiment allows us as well to create an environment with completely misaligned incentives 
which legislators might fear to exist. Compared to that the field provides evidence of auditors 
and investors with all kind of incentive alignments and thus makes it difficult to disentangle 
between the effects of disclosure and the incentive structure.   
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Our main findings of the experiment are the following. We replicate the perverse 
effect of disclosing conflict of interest noted by CLM. Even in our more controlled 
experimental setting, auditors impair their independence to a higher degree in the first round 
with the disclosure of conflict of interest. However, we find that this effect disappears and 
even reverts for experienced subjects from the second period on. Disclosing fees improves in 
these periods auditor independence. We find some evidence that this happens as the influence 
of moral licensing diminishes and fairness effects become more important with experience 
and the provision of feedback. Disclosure of conflict of interest also helps investors to give 
unbiased advice while investors in the no disclosure condition still give upward biased advice 
even with experience. Furthermore, we find evidence that disclosure of conflict of interest 
might disturb reputation building. This is expressed by less valuable information passed on by 
the auditors and worse calibrated estimates of investors when auditors’ incentives are 
disclosed. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we discuss the 
reasons for mandating disclosure of audit fees and present economic and psychological 
theories for the behavior of auditors and investors when incentives of auditors are disclosed 
and when they are not disclosed. In section III we describe the research design, before 
developing our hypotheses in section IV. In section V we report the results of our replication 
of the experiment by CLM and the effects of experience and reputation. We conclude the 
paper by summarizing our results and discussing possible implications for the auditing 
environment. 
 
2. Economic and Psychological Effects of Disclosing Auditors’ Fees 
2.1. Reasons of legislators for mandating disclosure of auditors’ fees 
Auditors have a “public watchdog” function as they have the duty to serve the 
creditors and investors of the audited company as well as the investing public in general 
(United States v. Arthur Young & Co. et al., 465 U.S. 805, 817–818). They have the 
professional obligation to be independent in their judgment from the client. However, auditors 
have sometimes incentives to please the audited company by issuing favorable audit opinions. 
These incentives may arise from audit and nonaudit fees which the auditor receives (Magee 
and Tseng, 1990). The high audit and nonaudit fees that audit companies received from 
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companies involved in accounting scandals like Enron or Worldcom might be considered as 
supporting this claim (Coffee, 2004). 
Legislators have reacted to this potential threat to auditor independence by both 
forbidding certain nonaudit services and mandating the disclosure of audit and nonaudit fees 
thereby following a “two-pronged approach” (SEC, 2000). Companies have to disclose 
separately the audit fees, audit-related fees, tax fees, and all other fees for the two most recent 
fiscal years (SEC, 2003a). The aim of that disclosure is to “shed light on the independence of 
public companies' auditors [to] assist investors in making investment […] decisions” (SEC, 
2003a). 
 
2.2. Empirical evidence of the influence of auditors’ fees on auditors’ independence 
Empirical studies measuring the effects of nonaudit fees on proxies for auditor 
independence, e. g. the size of discretionary accruals, the proportion of going-concern 
opinions or the extent of reliance on internal controls, find mixed results. While Frankel, 
Johnson and Nelson (2002), DeFond, Raghunandan, and Subramanyam (2002) and Felix Jr., 
Gramling and Maletta (2005) find a positive association, Larcker and Richardson (2005) 
show that this may hold only for some companies and many other studies do not find a 
significant relationship (Antle, et al., 2004; Ashbaugh, LaFond and Mayhew, 2003; Chung 
and Kallapur, 2003; Kinney Jr., Palmrose and Scholz, 2004; Reynolds, Deis and Francis, 
2004; Higgs and Skantz, 2006). The results for the influence of audit fees on auditor 
independence might be similar as audit fees and nonaudit fees are jointly determined 
(Whisenant, Sankaraguruswamy and Raghunandan, 2003; Simunic, 1984; Craswell, 1999). 
Some empirical studies indicate that auditor independence in appearance might be 
endangered when the audit company receives a high proportion of nonaudit fees (Shockley, 
1981; Pany and Reckers, 1987; Brandon, Crabtree and Maher, 2004; Mishra, Raghunandan 
and Rama, 2005; Higgs and Skantz, 2006) and from audit services (Gul, 1991).  
 
2.3. Economic theory for settings without disclosure of conflict of interest 
Economic theory suggests that the fees received from the audited company can be 
considered as incentives for the auditor to impair her independence (Watts and Zimmerman, 
1981). One necessary condition is that these fees can be seen as a proxy for future rents from 
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the audited company. Rents from an audit engagement can arise even in competitive settings 
when transaction costs of switching the auditor exist (DeAngelo, 1981). A further necessary 
condition is that the management can credibly threaten the auditor with the deprivation of 
these rents, e. g. by arranging the dismissal of the auditor (Magee and Tseng, 1990). As rents 
from nonaudit services are supposed to be higher than for audit services (SEC, 2000) and as it 
is probably easier for the management to credible threaten the auditor with a deprivation of 
those rents, nonaudit fees might have a bigger effect on auditor independence.  
One of the most important incentives to withstand such an impairment of auditor 
independence is a concern for reputation (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). A loss of reputation 
may lead to lower audit fees (Beatty, 1993; Craswell, Francis and Taylor, 1995; Francis, 
Reichelt and Wang, 2005) or even to a loss of audit clients (Chaney and Philipich, 2002; 
Krishnamurthy, Zhou and Zhou, 2006). However, it is not easy to predict under what 
circumstances reputation building will happen as it might be very context specific (Davis and 
Holt, 1993), p. 396). Auditing research has found that the cost that investors have to bear 
(King, 1996), the timeliness of feedback about the performance of auditors (Mayhew, 2001) 
and the ambiguousness of accounting standards (Mayhew, Schatzberg and Sevcik, 2001) may 
matter.   
When audit fees are not disclosed, investors have limited information to judge the 
auditor independence. Recent research has found that investors who have no information 
about a potential misreporting generally have trust in the reports as a default (Gneezy, 2005). 
Investors can however obtain noisy information about a potential impairment of independence 
over time by comparing actual outcomes with earlier reports. This can be compared to 
strategic learning (Camerer, Ho and Chong, 2003).  
 
2.4. Economic theory for settings with disclosure of conflict of interest 
Crawford and Sobel (1982) describe a theoretical framework for analyzing 
relationships in which a sender (the auditor) who has private information transmits a message 
to a receiver (the investor) who has the task to estimate the value of a quantity. The incentives 
of the rational and selfish sender and receiver may be misaligned and are common 
knowledge. The theory can be used to predict the level of truthfulness in auditors’ reports and 
the level of trust of investors when conflict of interest is disclosed. This framework has been 
used in accounting contexts to examine the role of multiple users of the message (Newman 
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and Sansing, 1993), proprietary costs of private information (Gigler, 1994) and imperfect 
private information (Fischer and Stocken, 2001). Probably due to the complexity, the role of 
non-disclosure of the incentives has not been analyzed in this framework. 
The model of Crawford and Sobel predicts for one-time interactions that if incentives 
of auditors and investors are aligned below a certain degree, auditors should only send 
uninformative signals to investors which should consequently be ignored by investors. With 
an increase of the alignment of incentives between auditors and investors from that degree on, 
the informativeness of auditors’ report and investors’ reliance thereon should generally 
increase monotonically (Dickhaut, McCabe and Mukherji, 1995). In case of fully aligned 
incentives, auditors will report their information truthfully and investors will fully rely on it.  
 
2.5. Psychological effects of disclosure of conflict of interest 
CLM argue that disclosure of conflict of interest might have psychological “perverse 
effects” on the behavior of auditors and investors. Auditors whose incentives to impair 
independence are disclosed might feel morally licensed to do so. They might consider 
impairing independence as “fair play” as the auditor is informed about it. The psychological 
cost of lying (Gneezy, 2005) in the form of accepting earnings management is removed when 
the investor is fully informed about the incentives of the auditor.  
Auditors might also allow more aggressive earnings management in the disclosure 
condition to counteract higher discounting of more skeptic investors. They might feel the need 
to shout even louder if investors who are informed by the incentives of the auditors cover 
their ears. This strategic effect can be considered as a psychological effect as there is no 
reason why auditors should not impair their independence to the same degree in the no 
disclosure condition. 
Ethical reasons speak for a lower impairment of auditor independence in the 
disclosure condition, because people avoid being regarded as unfair and such an unfair 
behavior can be much easier detected by an investor who is perfectly informed about the 
incentives of the auditor. Therefore it can be expected that people behave fairer in the 
disclosure condition (Güth, Huck and Ockenfels, 1996). 
Investors on the other hand should ignore the information passed on by the auditor 
when they are informed that the incentives of the auditors are misaligned to their own 
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incentives above a certain degree (Crawford and Sobel, 1982). But results from psychology 
and experimental economics show that people can suffer from a curse of knowledge bias 
(Camerer, Loewenstein and Weber, 1989). Investors receiving information from the auditor 
might therefore be unable to ignore it even if they should. This could make investors trust the 
information from the auditor to some degree even in the disclosure condition as it was the 
case in CLM. They might also follow the advice of the auditor when audit and nonaudit fees 
are disclosed as investors might even think that such a disclosure improves auditor 
independence (Gaynor, McDaniel and Neal, 2005). 
 
3. Experimental Design  
3.1. Experimental procedure 
In our laboratory setting we incorporate main features of an audit environment with 
misaligned incentives. The environment which we try to reconstruct consists of an auditor 
who receives rather precise information about the value of an asset through her audit 
procedures.2 The auditor passes on her information to an investor by certifying the financial 
statement in which a specific value is assigned to the asset.3 The investor has very little own 
information about the value of the asset except for the information certified by the auditor. 
Based on this information, the investor forms a belief about the value of the asset on which he 
might base his decision to buy or sell shares in the company. In the tradition of established 
methods of experimental economics, we use a generic frame to improve the internal validity 
of the experiment, e. g. the auditors are called “type A” and the investors are called “type B” 
in our instructions. We hereby want to keep out confounding effects of different 
interpretations of the term “auditor” by subjects as we want to focus on the strategic 
interaction in dependence on the disclosure of conflict of interest. 
The structure and details of our experimental design are shown in figure 1 and table 1. 
At the beginning of each of a total number of nine periods, the auditor receives private 
information about the value of an asset and has then to decide what information she sends to 
the investor. The value of the asset is randomly drawn from values uniformly distributed 
between 10.01 and 30.00. The private information which the auditor receives is the interval in 
which the value of the asset is located. Intervals are restricted to ]10,15], ]15,20], ]20,25], and 
                                                 
2 For a higher readability, we refer to the auditor as she and to the investor as he in the following. 
3 The information passed on by the auditor in the form of the certification of financial statements is in the 
following labeled advice. Hereby, we want to distinguish it from other kinds of information used in the 
experiment (e.g. public information, private information). 
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]25,30] and this is common knowledge. She then decides which information about the value 
of the asset she sends to the investor as advice. She is free to choose any value between 10.01 
and 30.00.  
The investor receives the public information about the range and distribution of 
possible values of the asset and the information sent to him by the auditor. His task is then to 
estimate the value of the asset based on this information. While this happens, the auditor is 
asked to give her guess what value of the asset the investor will estimate.  
The investor is paid based on the accuracy of his estimate. He receives the maximum 
payment of 5 taler (1 taler = 3 €) if he estimates the value of the asset correctly. If he 
estimates the value too high or too low, the difference between his estimate and the value of 
the asset is subtracted from the maximum payment. The minimum payment is 0 taler. This 
incentive scheme compares to an environment where investors do better in their investment 
decisions the more accurate they estimate the value of assets. 
The auditor is paid on how much the investor overestimates the value of the asset. She 
receives the difference between the estimate of the investor and the value of the asset in taler. 
Her maximum payment is 5 taler and the minimum payment is 0 taler. We offer therefore 
incentives to the auditor to send too high information to the investor in order to mislead him. 
This compares to an audit environment where the auditor has an incentive to impair her 
independence and accepts earning manipulations in exchange for higher audit or nonaudit 
fees. We want to examine this environment as this is the environment which legislators 
mandating disclosure of fees fear to exist. 
 
--- Insert figure 1 about here --- 
--- Insert table 1 about here --- 
 
The incentives of the auditor and the investor are fully misaligned in our experimental 
design. This might be criticized as being unrealistic in an auditing context. However, 
Crawford and Sobel (1982) show that the behavior of auditors and investors should be the 
same in settings of a higher alignment of incentives as long as the degree of alignment is 
below a certain level. Furthermore, if the degree of alignment increases from that level on, the 
tendency of experimental results should also hold as truth telling by the auditor should 
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generally increase monotonically (Dickhaut, McCabe and Mukherji, 1995). Finally, we can 
construct theoretically the behavior of auditors and investors in settings where their incentives 
are perfectly aligned. In such settings, auditors should report truthfully and investors should 
fully rely on this report. In our opinion, there is no reason to believe that such a behavior 
should not arise in experiments using settings of full alignment of incentives which is why we 
do not examine such a baseline experimentally. 
 
3.2. Experimental manipulation 
The first experimental manipulation is the disclosure of auditors’ conflict of interest to 
the investor. In one condition of this treatment, the investor is precisely informed about the 
incentives of the auditor (disclosure condition) and his comprehension thereof is ensured by 
control questions. In the other condition of the treatment, the investor receives no information 
at all about the incentive scheme of the auditor (no disclosure condition). The auditor is in 
both conditions informed how much knowledge the investor has about her incentives. The no 
disclosure condition is hereby meant to be indicative for the former situation where disclosure 
of audit and nonaudit fees was not mandated, whereas the condition of full disclosure of 
auditor’s incentives stands for the current situation were fees paid to the auditor has to be 
disclosed.  
The second experimental manipulation is the way auditors and investors are matched. 
Note that in all conditions, one auditor interacts with one investor. In the first condition, 
perfect stranger matching is used which means that each auditor interacts only for one of the 
nine periods with the same investor. In the second condition, partner matching is implemented 
where the auditor interacts with the same investor over all nine periods. We fix the length of 
the experiment and do not determine it randomly in order to ensure comparability to the non-
reputation setting. We believe that the setting of interaction with the same partner over all 
periods coupled with precise feedback provides ample opportunities for auditors to build up 
reputation. We believe so as research in experimental economics has shown that in general 
subjects do not induce backwards more than one or two steps (Camerer, Ho and Chong, 
2004). Furthermore, choosing an alternative design as determining the last period randomly or 
not informing the participants about the number of periods also has its disadvantages 
(Boatsman and Grasso, 1992). 
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The first period of the perfect stranger matching is a quasi-replication of the 
experiment of CLM in a more controlled environment. We consider only the first period as a 
replication as CLM conducted a quasi one-shot experiment: Though it lasted six periods, the 
participants were provided with no feedback over the first three periods and with only very 
limited feedback over the last three periods. As this feedback was in addition rather 
uninformative for investors due to an underestimation bias of the auditors, their setting hardly 
provides any opportunities for gaining experience. We consider our design as more clear-cut 
since consistent underestimation is ruled out by design, understanding of the setting by all 
subjects is ensured by control questionnaires, and detailed feedback is given after each round.  
We classify the 2nd to 8th period of the perfect stranger matching as the experience 
setting. We already consider subjects interacting for the second time as experienced as our 
experimental setting is rather simple, control questions are used and detailed feedback is 
provided. This is also supported by the results reported below which change significantly 
already from the first to the second period. We exclude the ninth period to ensure 
comparability to the reputation setting where we exclude the last period to eliminate possible 
last round effects. 
We classify the 2nd to 8th period of the partner matching treatment as the reputation 
setting. We eliminate the first round to ensure comparability to the experience setting and 
eliminate the ninth round to eliminate possible last round effects. 
 
--- Insert table 2 about here --- 
 
The experiment was conducted at the experimental lab of the national research center 
on concepts of rationality, decision-making and economic modeling 
(Sonderforschungsbereich 504) at the University of Mannheim, Germany, using subjects 
recruited from the mailing list of the experimental lab where mostly students from the 
University of Mannheim are inscribed. The decisions forms were computerized using zTree 
(Fischbacher, 1999). We conducted 8 sessions in a 2 x 2 between-subject design, with two 
sessions for each of the four treatment conditions (see table 2). In each session 18 to 20 
subjects participated to whom either the role of an auditor or of an investor was randomly 
assigned in equal proportion. All together, 148 subjects participated and all of them 
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completed the session. Each session lasted about 40 to 50 minutes with payoffs for each 
subject ranging from 2.50 € (3.00 $) to 17.50 € (21.00 $) and averaging 8.30 € (10.00 $). For 
determining payoffs, one period of the nine periods was randomly selected in each session. 
 
4. Hypotheses 
4.1. Stranger interaction without feedback: replication of Cain, Loewenstein, and Moore 
(2005) 
We classify the first period of the perfect stranger matching as the replication of the 
experiment of CLM.  
According to CLM, auditors might feel reluctant to follow only their self-interest 
when their conflict of interest is not disclosed to investors. With the disclosure of the conflict 
of interest, these moral concerns could at least partly be removed. Auditors might consider it 
to some degree fair play and feel “morally licensed” to follow only their self-interest when 
investors are informed about it. Connected to this argument are studies initiated by (Gneezy, 
2005) which show that lying can bear psychological costs which might be removed through 
the disclosure of conflict of interest. In addition to this, auditors might also be motivated to 
pursue stronger their self-interest in the disclosure condition in an effort to counteract 
increased skepticism by the other party who is informed about the conflict of interest. 
Investors should ignore reports by auditors when they are informed that the incentives 
of the auditors are as misaligned as in our experiment. However, they might suffer the curse-
of-knowledge bias (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Camerer, Loewenstein and Weber, 1989) 
and anchor too much on the higher advice of the auditor in the disclosure condition. 
 
Hypothesis 1:  The advice bias4 is larger in the disclosure condition than in the no 
    disclosure condition. 
Hypothesis 2:  The estimate bias5 is larger in the disclosure condition than in the no 
    disclosure condition. 
 
 
                                                 
4 Advice bias is hereby defined as the difference between the advice and the expected value of the asset (= 
middle of the interval of the private information of the auditor). 
5 Estimate bias is defined as the difference between the estimate and the expected value of the asset (= middle of 
the interval of the private information of the auditor).  
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4.2. Stranger interaction with feedback: the experience setting 
Our first extension of the experiment of CLM is that we do not use a quasi-one-shot 
design, but let auditors interact with investors over nine periods with detailed feedback after 
each round. We hereby test for effects of experience and strategic learning.  
In the no disclosure condition, the auditor has only incentives to give biased advice. 
Incentives for truthful reporting do not exist as reputation building is not possible due to the 
perfect stranger matching. Therefore the auditor should always send the highest possible 
value of the asset to the investor (e. g. Magee and Tseng 1990).  
In the disclosure condition, the auditor has theoretically no incentives to give upward 
biased advice as investors should ignore her advice according to economic theory. The auditor 
should therefore send uninformative advice (Crawford and Sobel 1982). However, it might be 
plausible that investors nevertheless rely to some degree on auditors’ advice. Even if this is 
the case, we predict that advice of the auditor will be less biased in the disclosure condition as 
the auditor might feel more strongly the need to appear fair towards the investor as the 
intentions of her behavior are best observable for the investor in the disclosure condition with 
feedback (Güth, Huck and Ockenfels, 1996).  
We hypothesize that the psychological effects found to be of relevance by CLM are of 
less importance for experienced subjects. Auditors might feel morally licensed to give biased 
advice also in the disclosure condition after they experience that they need to lie in order to 
receive higher payments. Differences in auditors’ behavior in dependence on the disclosure 
condition might also diminish after subjects in the disclosure condition experience that trying 
to counteract skepticism of investors by giving higher advice is not successful. 
For investors we hypothesize that they give more accurate and less biased advice in 
the disclosure condition as they are better informed about the incentives of auditors and can 
therefore better discount their advice. We expect anchoring effects to disappear as investors 
gain experience. We expect that investors in the no disclosure condition are misled by the 
biased advice of the auditor though some strategic learning about the incentives of the 
auditors might happen over the time.  
We would like to emphasize that the following hypotheses for the experience setting 
are just opposite to our hypotheses for the replication of CLM and to the results of CLM. 
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Hypothesis 3:  The advice bias is lower in the disclosure condition than in the no 
    disclosure condition. 
Hypothesis 4:  The estimate bias is lower in the disclosure condition than in the no 
    disclosure condition. 
 
4.3. Partner interaction with feedback: the reputation setting 
Our second extension of the experiment of CLM is that we manipulate the matching of 
auditors and investors. We test for reputation effects by conducting a partner matching in 
which the same auditor interacts with the same investor over all nine periods.  
Economic theory does not provide for hypothesis what the effects of disclosure will be 
in a repeated setting. To explore possible effects of disclosure, we state therefore the null 
hypothesis that it will have no effects.  
 
Hypothesis 5:   The advice bias is the same in both disclosure conditions. 
Hypothesis 6:   The estimate bias is the same in both disclosure conditions. 
 
We examine also the effects of reputation by comparing the results of the reputation 
setting to those of the experience setting for each of the two disclosure conditions. In both 
conditions, the potential loss of auditor reputation should serve as an incentive for the auditor 
to report truthfully. The bias in the report of the auditor should therefore be smaller in the 
reputation setting compared to the experience setting. Investors should profit from this by 
giving less biased and more accurate estimates. 
 
Hypothesis 7:  In the no disclosure condition of the reputation setting, the 
advice bias and the estimate bias are lower than in the no 
disclosure condition of the experience setting.  
Hypothesis 8:  In the disclosure condition of the reputation setting, the advice 
bias and the estimate bias are lower as in the disclosure 
condition of the experience setting.  
 
 15
5. Results 
5.1. Statistical modeling  
If not otherwise mentioned we use parametric tests which control for the individual 
subject and the interval of the value of the asset in our statistical analyses. We control for the 
individual subject by including it as a random effect in the model as the decisions of a single 
individual in different periods cannot be considered as being independent.6 Since standard t-
test might be biased, we control for the interval of the value of the asset by including it as a 
fixed effect in the model as the bias of the advice and the estimate depend on it by definition. 
We classify hereby the interval as a continuous variable suspecting an approximate linear 
trend. We report among other things the means estimated by the statistical model, The so-
called LS-Means presented for one factor are adjusted for the effects of other factors. The 
statistical analysis was done using JMP version 5.0.1. 
 
5.2. Results for the replication of Cain, Loewenstein, and Moore (2005) 
We label the first period of the perfect stranger matching as the replication of the 
experiment of CLM. The descriptive data summarized in table 3 show that the mean value of 
the advice of the auditors is higher in the disclosure condition than in the no disclosure 
condition (26.28 vs. 23.35) and more biased (5.17 vs. 2.52). Despite the higher advice in the 
disclosure condition, auditors do not expect investors to give higher estimates (22.61 vs. 
22.72). Actually, investors in the disclosure condition even estimate the value of the asset to 
be lower than investors in the no disclosure condition (19.81 vs. 22.36) and are less upward 
biased (-1.31 vs. 1.53). 
Hypothesis 1 is marginally confirmed as the advice bias is border line significantly 
higher in the disclosure condition than in the no disclosure condition (p=0.101). Hypothesis 2 
stated that estimates of investors are more biased in the disclosure condition. This hypothesis 
cannot be confirmed. Instead we find marginal support for the opposite as the estimate bias is 
border line significantly lower in the disclosure condition (p=0.095). The results of the test 
statistics are graphically presented in figure 2. 
                                                 
6 We are aware of the fact that one could argue we should even further aggregate the values of all individuals in 
a perfect stranger matching session to one single value as there are indirect interactions between all of them. 
However, we believe that this would go too far as the subjects do not directly interact with each other as opposed 
to a market setting where direct interaction between all subjects happens. We also find that our results hold when 
controlling for carry over effects from the preceding period. 
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--- Insert figure 2 about here --- 
 
We are therefore able to replicate the “perverse effects of disclosure of conflict of 
interest” of CLM on auditor independence for a setting where auditors and investors are 
inexperienced and have not received any feedback yet. However, we do not find evidence that 
investors suffer from the curse-of-knowledge bias as they are not misled by the higher advice 
in the disclosure condition into giving higher estimates. The reason for this might be that our 
subjects were well informed about the experimental environment due to control questions. 
Interestingly, they are even too skeptic and discount the advice too much in the disclosure 
condition.  
 
5.3. Results for the experience setting 
We classify the 2nd to 8th period of the perfect stranger matching as the experience 
setting. Qualitative results do not change when including the last round in the analysis. The 
descriptive results (see table 3) show that the advice of experienced auditors is lower (24.72 
vs. 26.44) and less biased (4.40 vs. 6.28) with the disclosure of conflict of interest compared 
to the situation without this disclosure. Experienced investors are still more biased (2.78 vs. -
0.65) and give higher estimates (22.94 vs. 19.67) in the no disclosure condition. 
Hypothesis 3 can be marginally supported as the advice bias for experienced auditors 
is lower when their incentives to impair independence are disclosed (p=0.056). Hypothesis 4 
is confirmed as the estimate bias of the investors is highly significantly lower in the disclosure 
condition (p=0.001). The results of the test statistics are graphically presented in figure 3. 
 
--- Insert figure 3 about here --- 
 
We find therefore that the perverse effects of disclosure of conflict of interest on 
auditors’ behavior do not hold from the second period on and even revert (p=0.001 for the 
effects of the interaction between disclosure and first period on the advice bias). Auditor 
independence improves with the disclosure of their incentives instead of being more impaired 
as they gain experience.  
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We further explored reasons for this change in behavior and find some evidence that 
moral licensing and the psychological costs of lying diminish after the first period. For doing 
so, we asked all subjects whether they consider it morally correct to give upward biased 
advice in the experiment. We find that auditors who are morally concerned show a lower 
advice bias in the first period. This effect however disappears from the second period on as 
shown in figure 4 (p=0.029 for the effects of the interaction between the classification of 
giving upward biased advice as a lie and the first period on the advice bias). 
 
--- Insert figure 4 about here --- 
 
Experienced investors can profit from the higher independence of experienced 
auditors insofar as their estimates are less biased. However, as their estimates are even 
downward biased, they cannot profit from it through higher payoffs which stay about the 
same when compared to the replication setting of inexperienced subjects (1.23 vs. 1.20). 
These findings are in accordance with Dopuch, King and Schwartz who also find that the 
quality of decision-making of investors do not significantly improve with the disclosure of 
fees even if it signals the correct level of auditor independence.  
The downward bias in the estimates affects also the payoffs of auditors negatively 
which are significantly lower in the disclosure condition (p=0.001). The higher independence 
of experienced auditors in the disclosure condition is therefore not rewarded which confirms 
the results of King (1996) who also finds that truthful reporting was not rewarded by 
investors. 
 
--- Insert table 4 about here --- 
 
5.4. Results for the reputation setting 
We classify the 2nd to 8th period of the partner matching treatment as the reputation 
setting. Again, qualitative results do not change when including additionally the data of the 1st 
or 9th period. The descriptive results (see table 3) show that the advice and the advice bias is 
for both disclosure conditions on a similar level (24.24 and 3.71 vs. 23.39 and 3.87). 
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Estimates and estimate biases are however smaller in the disclosure condition (19.87 and -
0.67 vs. 21.68 and 2.16). 
Hypothesis 5 stated that there will be no difference in the advice bias for both 
conditions. As the difference is indeed not significant, this hypothesis cannot be rejected 
(p=0.64). Hypothesis 6 predicted the same for the estimate bias and can be rejected as the 
estimate bias is significantly smaller in the disclosure condition (p=0.004). The results of the 
test statistics are graphically presented in figure 2. 
 
--- Insert figure 5 about here --- 
 
Though the advice bias is about the same in both disclosure conditions, this does not 
mean that the mean behavior of auditors is the same regarding the private information. Indeed 
the interaction effect of disclosure and the interval of the asset on the advice is highly 
significant (p=0.001). While auditors in the disclosure condition give about the same advice 
for each interval (average difference in advice is 1.14 per interval), they differentiate much 
more in the no disclosure condition as shown in figure 6 (average difference in advice is 3.13 
per interval). Therefore, it can be concluded that auditors in the no disclosure condition try to 
form some reputation by giving more informative advice. This does not happen in the 
disclosure condition. 
 
--- Insert figure 6 about here --- 
 
Such an interaction between the disclosure of incentives and the interval of the asset 
exists also for the estimate (p=0.001). While investors give about the same estimate regardless 
of the true value of the asset (average difference in estimate of -0.24 per interval), they are 
able to give higher estimates for higher true values of the asset in the no disclosure condition 
as shown in figure 7 (average difference in estimate of 3.06 per interval). Hints for a better 
calibration of the estimates of investors in the no disclosure condition are also the higher 
payoffs for the investors in this condition (1.48 vs. 2.10; p=0.009; see table 4). 
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--- Insert figure 7 about here --- 
 
Hypothesis 7 can be confirmed for the most part as the advice bias is significantly 
lower (p=0.001) and less biased (p=0.13) in the no disclosure condition of the reputation 
setting. This is in accordance with the results above that reputation formation happens in this 
setting. For the disclosure condition we find no evidence for reputation formation when 
testing hypothesis 8 as the advice bias is not significantly lower in the reputation setting 
(p=0.63) and the estimate bias is about the same in both conditions (-0.67 vs. -0.65; p=0.80).  
In summary, we find that reputation formation is hindered by the disclosure of conflict 
of interest. Auditors provide less valuable advice in the disclosure condition which also 
affects the decision-quality of investors negatively. They send uninformative advice and are 
less trusted by investors.  
 
5.5. Overall robustness of results: A regression analysis and payoffs  
To check for the overall robustness of our main results, we fit a general linear mixed 
model employing all data. We are interested in the determinants of auditors’ advice bias and 
investors’ estimate bias. To account for individual characteristics of participants an error 
components econometric model with the individual as the random component has been used 
(see table 5).  
Beside subject specific effects, which are controlled for by the specified model, other 
factors might drive the results as well. In the previous analyses we found the advice bias 
strongly influenced by the interval of the chosen value. Therefore we control for the interval 
and find a higher advice bias in lower intervals. This observation is more pronounced in the 
disclosure condition and less pronounced with reputation. A time trend can be found in the 
data as well. Advice bias in later periods increases slightly with this effect more pronounced 
in the reputation treatment. We cannot find evidence that auditors systematically react to the 
estimate bias of the paired investor in the former period.  
Regarding the bias of advice, disclosure of conflict of interest has no overall 
significant effect which can be partly traced back to the marginally significant interaction with 
the first period. This interaction provides a consistency check of the perverse effects first 
pointed out by CLM. Additionally, disclosure interacts highly significantly with the interval 
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of the asset. This means that the advice bias of the auditor is lower only for low asset values. 
These low asset values are especially interesting as problems of auditor independence mainly 
relate to accepting earning overstatements. Therefore it can be stated that disclosure of 
conflict of interest improves auditor independence.  
Disclosure of conflict of interest has a highly significant influence on the estimate 
bias. The data suggests that disclosure of conflict of interest might be helpful to reduce the 
prediction bias of investors. Reputation has a highly significant influence in interaction with 
the interval of the asset. Thus repeated interaction with the same auditor is helpful for auditors 
for low asset values.  
When looking at investors’ and auditors' payoffs it turns out that the lower estimate 
bias in all disclosure treatments does not translate into higher payoffs of investors when 
compared to no disclosure. One explanation is that payoffs are driven by coordination effects. 
Since we designed the game as a fixed pie distribution game when the estimate is above the 
value and with decreasing pie the estimate being below the value, the sum of investor and 
auditor payoffs is higher in treatments where investors consistently overestimate the value. 
This is the case in the no disclosure treatment and thus the sum of auditors' and investors’ 
payoff is significantly higher (see Table 4, coordination) . When investigating the no 
disclosure treatment we find without repeated interaction auditors to receive a relatively larger 
part of the pie and with repeated interaction the pie almost distributed evenly between both 
types. This observation confirms that reputation has an effect in the no-disclosure treatment 
and plays a minor role in the disclosure treatment. 
Auditors' payoffs are significantly lower in the disclosure condition for both the 
experience (1.66 vs. 2.65; p=0.001) and the reputation setting (1.60 vs. 2.18; p=0.017; see 
table 4). Since auditors send less informative advice, investors are less calibrated. Disclosure 
of conflict of interest is in our experiment therefore comparable to a sanction for the activity 
disclosed.  
 
6. Conclusions 
Mandatory disclosure of audit and nonaudit fees has recently been revived in the U.S. 
and will soon be prescribed in all countries of the European Union (EC 2005). It is hoped that 
disclosure of conflict of interest can ameliorate problems of threats to auditor independence 
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by enabling investors to make better investment decisions. However, effects of disclosure of 
fees on auditor independence in fact have hardly been researched yet. A reason might be that 
such effects are difficult to examine empirically due to missing data about auditors’ fees 
before their disclosure was mandatory. Some research has examined the effects of disclosure 
of fees on market efficiency experimentally (Dopuch, King and Schwartz, 2003; Davis and 
Hollie, 2005). To our knowledge, the first paper that examines experimentally the effects of 
disclosure of fees on auditor independence is that of CLM. We advance their research by 
using a more controlled experimental design and extending the setting by testing for effects of 
experience and reputation – two main characteristics of the auditing environment.  
Legislators prescribing the disclosure of fees implicitly assume that high audit and 
nonaudit fees might impair auditor independence. Economic theory and some empirical 
evidence also indicate that the higher the fees from a certain client are, the higher is the 
danger that the auditors impair their independence. We therefore assume for our experimental 
setting that the disclosure of fees is comparable to a disclosure of conflict of interest. 
We derive the hypotheses for the different settings of our experiment by combining 
conventional economic models of auditor independence (DeAngelo, 1981; Magee and Tseng, 
1990) with economic theory predicting the degree of independence in reporting when 
incentives of auditors and investors diverge and are common knowledge (Crawford and 
Sobel, 1982). We consider also psychological effects found to be relevant in settings of 
disclosure of conflict of interest by CLM and apply results from experimental economics 
concerning fairness (Güth, Huck and Ockenfels, 1996). 
The first main result of our experiment is that the perverse effects of disclosure of 
conflict of interest on auditor independence reported by CLM can be replicated in a more 
controlled experiment as long as subjects are inexperienced. Auditors whose incentives are 
disclosed give more biased advice probably to counteract their lower credibility. Investors are 
however able to discount the advice of the auditor in the disclosure condition and are not 
prone to anchoring effects. They even show some degree of overskepticism as their estimates 
are somewhat downward biased.  
Our second main result is that the disclosure of conflict of interest can have positive 
effects if subjects are experienced. Experienced auditors give less biased advice in the 
disclosure condition. The change in behavior of the auditors in the disclosure condition can be 
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explained by a diminished influence of moral licensing with experience and increased 
importance of fairness effects with the provision of feedback. 
Our third main result is that disclosure of conflict of interest has however negative 
effects in the sense that it hinders reputation formation of auditors and leads to more distrust 
by investors. While auditors in the disclosure condition cannot build up reputation and instead 
send only uninformative advice, auditors in the no disclosure condition give advice that is 
more strongly associated with the true value of the asset in the reputation setting. Their 
information is also more informative as it is more closely aligned to the true values of the 
asset. This allows investors to give better calibrated estimates though they are still upward 
biased. 
Our fourth main results is that disclosure of conflict of interest might be an essential 
tool for eliminating biases in the estimates of investors in circumstances where auditor 
independence is impaired. Without such a disclosure, investors’ estimate bias is upward 
biased over all settings. It is not mitigated either by experience nor reputation.  
As a first implication of our experiment for the audit environment, we want to stress 
the positive effects of disclosure of conflict of interest for experienced subjects. Disclosure 
lowers the impairment of auditor independence and allows investors to make unbiased 
investment decisions. It may even support ethical behavior of auditors by giving auditors the 
incentive to appear fair. Though we replicate the perverse effects of disclosure reported by 
CLM for inexperienced subjects, we find no evidence of their appearance for experienced 
subjects. The effects found by CLM might therefore be of little relevance for the auditing 
environment. 
As a second implication, we would like to point out potential negative effects of 
disclosure of conflict of interest. Disclosure hinders reputation formation and leads to more 
distrust by investors which has the effect of lower informativeness of audit reports and lower 
quality of decision-making. It leads therefore to a situation where both auditors and investors 
are worse off than before. Disclosure of conflict has therefore a sanctioning effect on the 
activity disclosed.  
Audit companies who nevertheless want to stay engaged in the non-audit services 
should be aware of this negative effect and take measure to counteract potential reputation 
losses. This could be done for example by complementing the disclosure of fees by 
 23
communicating the reasons for providing non-audit services to investors or by describing 
implemented safe-guards for ensuring auditor independence.  
Legislators should be careful in prescribing the disclosure of conflict of interest. It 
shall be remembered that one of the reasons why the SEC stopped mandating disclosure of 
fees in 1982 after its introduction in 1978 was, that it was worried of an “unwarranted 
curtailment of nonaudit services” (SEC, 1982, p. 3810). Such a sanctioning effect for 
nonaudit fees seems to be wanted to some degree by legislators (SEC, 2000). Sanctioning is 
however certainly not intended for regular audit services as high audit fees can also be a sign 
of the provision of high audit quality. Mandating the disclosure of audit fees might then 
unnecessarily and unintentionally destroy reputation of audit companies and lower audit 
quality. 
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Figure 1 
Auditor-Investor-Game 
The value of the asset is randomly distributed between 10.01 and 30.00. The auditor receives 
private information about the interval in which the value of the asset is located. The auditor is 
free to send any advice in the possible range of values of the asset to the investor. The 
investor has the task to estimate the value of the asset having information about the 
distribution of possible asset values and the advice of the auditor. The investor is paid based 
on the accuracy of his estimate. The auditor is paid based on the overestimation of the 
investor. The minimum payment for investors and auditors is 0 taler and the maximum 
payment is 5 taler. At the end of the session, one of the nine periods is randomly drawn as the 
payoff period. One taler is then converted into 3.00 Euro and a show-up fee of 2.50 Euro is 
added to compute the total payoff. 
Π auditor and Π investor  show the respective formulas for calculating the payoff of the auditor and 
the investor. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
advice estimate  
Auditor Investor 
Receives correct 
interval as private 
information
Payoffs 
Π auditor = max{min{estimate investor –value, 5},0}    Π investor = max{5 – |estimate investor –value|, 0} 
Common knowledge 
Value of asset randomly drawn from a uniform distribution ]10; 30] 
Correct interval ]10; 15], ]15; 20], ]20; 25] or ]25; 30] is given to the 
auditor
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 Figure 2 
Replication of Cain, Loewenstein, and Moore (2005) 
The replication of CLM is defined as the first period of the stranger matching. 
Expected value of the asset = mean of the interval provided to the auditor as private 
information = mean of the interval from which the value of the asset was drawn. 
Advice bias = advice of auditor – expected value of the asset  
Estimate bias = estimate of investor – expected value of the asset  
The respective LS means are shown by horizontal bars, the 95% confidence intervals are 
shown as vertical bars and the p-values controlled for the interval of the asset are reported. 
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Figure 3 
Experience setting 
The experience setting is defined as the 2nd to 8th period of the stranger matching. 
Expected value of the asset = mean of the interval provided to the auditor as private 
information = mean of the interval from which the value of the asset was drawn. 
Advice bias = advice of auditor – expected value of the asset  
Estimate bias = estimate of investor – expected value of the asset  
The respective LS means are shown by horizontal bars, the 95% confidence intervals are 
shown as vertical bars and the p-values controlled for the interval of the asset are reported.  
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Figure 4 
Effect of moral judgment on advice bias 
The interaction of period and the moral judgment of the auditors are plotted. To extract the 
moral judgment, auditors were asked whether they think that giving upward biased advice is 
morally correct on a 7-step Likert scale. Answers from 1-3 were classified as “morally 
unconcerned”, answers from 5-7 were classified as “morally concerned”. Undecided subjects 
(answer=4) were excluded from this analysis.  
Response variable is advice bias defined as advice minus expected value of asset according to 
private information of auditor. As giving upward biased advice is theoretically not possible if 
the value of the asset is in the highest interval, this interval was excluded for this analysis. 
In the model it is controlled for the main effects of the concern about lying and disclosure. 
Additionally it is controlled for the interval of the asset (continuous), period of the game and 
the interactions of disclosure with the period of the game and the concern about lying 
(nominal). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Morally 
unconcerned 
Morally 
concerned 
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Figure 5 
Reputation setting 
The reputation setting is defined as the 2nd to 8th period of the partner matching.  
Expected value of the asset = mean of the interval provided to the auditor as private 
information = mean of the interval from which the value of the asset was drawn. 
Advice bias = advice of auditor – expected value of the asset  
Estimate bias = estimate of investor – expected value of the asset  
The respective LS means are shown by horizontal bars, the 95% confidence intervals are 
shown as vertical bars and the p-values controlled for the interval of the asset are reported. 
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Figure 6 
Advice for each interval of the value of the asset (reputation setting) 
The means of advice controlled for subjects as a random effect are plotted for each of the four 
possible intervals of the value of the asset. The solid line indicates the true values (slope of 
this line equals the length of interval (=5)). 
The slopes in the no disclosure are significantly higher (p<0.001) which indicates a higher 
informativeness of the advice in the no disclosure condition 
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Figure 7 
Estimate for each interval of the value of the asset (reputation setting) 
The means of estimate controlled for subjects as a random effect are plotted for each of the 
four possible intervals of the value of the asset. The solid line indicates the true values (slope 
of this line equals the length of interval (=5)). 
The slopes in the no disclosure are significantly higher (p<0.001) which indicates a better 
calibration of the estimate in the no disclosure condition. 
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slope = 3.06 (SD = 0.33) 
 
slope = -0.24 (SD = 0.41) 
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Table 1  
Comparison of experimental design 
 
 Cain, Loewenstein, and Moore (2005) This study 
Task Estimating value of a jar of coins Estimating value of an asset 
Value of Asset Six jars with values from $10 to $30 Random value from a uniform 
distribution from 10.01 to 30.00  
Incentives Base Payment 7.50 $ 
Variable Payment 0–5.50$  
Min: 7.50$ Max: 13.50$ 
Random period is paid out 
Base Payment 2.50 € 
Variable Payment 0–15 €  
Min. 2.50€   Max. 17.50€ 
Random period is paid out 
Auditors’ 
payoff 
function 
Π auditor = 
 
5.01value-estimate5.50
......
1.50value-estimate1.011.90
1value-estimate0.51.00
0.5value- estimate0
⎪⎪
⎪
⎩
⎪⎪
⎪
⎨
⎧
≥
≤≤
≤≤
<
 
Π auditor =  
max{min{estimate investor –value, 
5},0}     
Investors’ 
payoff 
function 
Π investor = 
 
5.01|value-estimate|0.00
......
1.50|value-estimate|1.014.00
1.00|value-estimate|0.514.50
0.50|value- estimate|5.00
⎪⎪
⎪
⎩
⎪⎪
⎪
⎨
⎧
≥
≤<
≤<
≤
 
Π investor =  
max{5 – |estimate investor –value|, 0} 
 
Control 
question 
No Yes 
Disclosing 
conflict of 
interest 
„Auditor is paid on how high you 
estimate“ 
Detailed information about 
incentive scheme and control 
questions 
Information of 
the auditor 
Observing physical jar of coins closely 
(true values: $10.01, $12.50, $15.58, 
$19.83, $24.00, $27.06) 
Interval in which the value of the 
asset is uniformly distributed: 
]10,15]; ]15,20]; ]20,25]; ]25,30] 
Information of 
the investor 
Observing jar from the distance Information of the total interval 
of ]10,30] and its distribution  
Passing on of 
advice 
Shuffeling of advice forms; 
6 periods with 3-5 auditors 
Matching by computer:  
I.  9 periods total stranger 
matching 
II. 9 periods partner matching 
Feedback No feedback in periods 1-3.  
Limited feedback in periods 4-6. 
Feedback about the value of the 
asset and the payout payoff after 
each period. 
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Table 2 
Experimental treatments 
 
Experimental treatments* Disclosing conflict of interest to investor 
 Disclosure No disclosure 
Replication of CLM 
(1st period of the 
perfect stranger matching) 
Experience setting 
(2nd to 8th period of the 
perfect stranger matching) 
2 sessions = 
18 cohorts = 
36 subjects 
2 sessions = 
18 cohorts = 
36 subjects 
Reputation setting 
(2nd to 8th period of the 
partner matching) 
2 sessions = 
20 cohorts = 
40 subjects 
2 sessions = 
18 cohorts = 
36 subjects 
*The study included 148 subjects; each subject participated in 9 rounds  
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Table 3 
Descriptive and test statistics for advice and estimates for all settings 
Advice = auditors’ advice  
Advice bias = advice – expected value of the asset  
Exp. estimate = estimate of the investor as expected by the auditor 
Estimate = investors’ estimate 
Estimate bias = estimate – expected value of the asset 
Estimate error = | estimate – expected value of the asset| 
Expected value of the asset = mean value of the interval of the asset 
n=20 for the disclosure/reputation setting, for all other settings n=18 
 
 
 
  
  Disclosure 
Mean (SD) 
No disclosure 
Mean (SD)    
Advice 26.28 (4.37) 23.35 (6.11) 
Advice bias 5.17 (5.19) 2.52 (7.07) 
Auditor  
 
Exp. estimate 22.61 (3.93) 22.72 (4.68) 
Estimate 19.81 (4.21) 22.36 (4.85) 
Estimate bias -1.31 (5.97) 1.53 (7.15) 
Replication: 
1st period 
perfect stranger 
matching  Investor 
 
Estimate error 4.53 (3.97) 5.31 (4.87) 
Advice 24.72 (2.97) 26.44 (2.22) 
Advice bias 4.40 (4.12) 6.28 (3.06) 
Auditor  
 
Exp. Estimate 21.83 (2.84) 23.37 (2.22) 
Estimate 19.67 (2.55) 22.94 (2.37) 
Estimate bias -0.65 (2.21) 2.78 (2.37) 
Experience: 
2nd-8th period 
perfect stranger 
matching+ Investor 
 
Estimate error 5.88 (1.08) 6.04 (1.13) 
Advice 24.24 (3.38) 23.39 (2.99) 
Advice bias 3.71 (3.76) 3.87 (1.95) 
Auditor  
  
Exp. Estimate 20.89 (1.91) 21.88 (2.33) 
Estimate 19.87 (2.31) 21.68 (2.66) 
Estimate bias -0.67 (2.63) 2.16 (1.57) 
Reputation:  
2nd-8th period 
partner 
matching+ 
 
Investor 
 
Estimate error 5.89 (1.82) 3.47 (1.36) 
+Qualitative results hold when using 1st-9the or 2nd-9th period data  
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Table 4 
Average payoffs by disclosure for the experience and reputation setting 
Payoffs are the average hypothetical payoffs for the 2nd to 8th period. They are hypothetical 
payoffs, because not the average payoff was paid out but only one period was randomly 
chosen as the payoff period at the end of the session. 
Coordination is measured by dividing the total of auditors’ and investors’ average payoff by 
the total maximum payoff of five taler. 
n=20 for the disclosure/reputation setting, for all other settings n=18 
 
  Disclosure No disclosure  
  payoffs 
mean (SD) 
payoffs 
mean (SD) 
p (two-sided 
t-test) 
Auditor  1.66 (0.62) 2.65 (0.81) 0.001** 
Investor 1.23 (0.54) 1.20 (0.53) 0.858 
Experience: 
2nd-8th period perfect 
stranger matching+ Coordination 57.6% 77.0% 0.004** 
Auditor 1.60 (0.69) 2.18 (0.72) 0.017** 
Investor  1.48 (0.63) 2.10 (0.73) 0.009** 
Reputation:  
2nd-8th period partner 
matching+ Coordination 61.8% 85.6% 0.001** 
Auditor  0.837 0.061*  
Investor 0.273 0.001**  
Experience vs. 
reputation 
 p (two-sided t-test) Coordination 0.537 0.019**  
*(**) significant at the 10% (5%)-level.  
+Qualitative results hold when using 1st-9th or 2nd-9th period data (see Appendix A) 
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Table 5 
Generalized Least Squares (GLS) random effects regression analysis of the 
determinants of advice bias and estimate bias 
Disclosure (nominal) = 1 if disclosing conflict of interest, 0 otherwise 
Reputation (nominal) = 1 if partners matching, 0 if strangers matching 
1st Period (nominal) = 1 if period equals one, 0 otherwise 
Period (continuous) = experimental period 1 to 9 
Interval (continuous) = interval of the value of the asset which the auditor receives as private 
information, 1 = ]10,15], 2 = ]15,20], 3 = ]20,25], 4 = ]25,30] 
Estimate Bias-1 (continuous) = Estimate bias of the investor with whom the auditor interacted 
in the previous period, empty in 1st period 
Advice Bias-1 (continuous) = Advice bias of the investor with whom the auditor interacted in 
the previous period, empty in 1st period 
n=666 observations, 74 subjects as random effect 
    
 
      
 
Coefficients  Dependent variable 
 Advice bias Estimate bias 
 Mean SD Mean SD 
Intercept 11.28 (0.60)*** 11.95 (0.58)*** 
    
Effects    
Disclosure 0.17 (0.40) -1.19 (0.36)*** 
Reputation -0.64 (0.40) -0.08 (0.36) 
1st Period -0.07 (0.30) -0.63 (0.32)* 
Period 0.33 (0.07)*** -0.04 (0.08) 
Interval -3.32 (0.15)*** -4.17 (0.16)*** 
Disclosure*1st Period 0.53 (0.30)* 0.26 (0.32) 
Disclosure*Period -0.03 (0.07) -0.00 (0.08) 
Disclosure*Interval -0.62 (0.15)*** -0.66 (0.16)*** 
Disclosure*Reputation 0.08 (0.37) 0.28 (0.33) 
Reputation*1st Period 0.17 (0.30) 0.29 (0.32) 
Reputation*Period 0.21 (0.07)*** 0.09 (0.08) 
Reputation*Interval 0.52 (0.15)*** 0.63 (0.16)*** 
Reputation*Disclosure*1st 
Period 
-0.55 (0.25)** 0.06 (0.26) 
Reputation*Disclosure*In
terval 
-0.34 (0.15)** -0.56 (0.16)*** 
Estimate Bias-1 0.02 (0.03)  
Advice Bias-1    -0.20 (0.03)*** 
    
Adjusted R2 0.566 0.603 
*(**)[***] significant at the 10% (5%) [1%]-level 
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Appendix A 
 
Translation of the instructions 
Welcome to our experiment. Please read the following two pages of the instructions 
carefully. [Disclosure: Instructions are for all participants the same.] [No disclosure: 
Instructions are different for participant of type A and B.] During the whole experiment we 
ask you to stay quiet and not to talk to your neighbor. Please turn off your mobile phone. In 
the case that you have any questions please raise your hand and one of the experimenters will 
come to you. 
In the experiment you can earn money. The amount you are going to earn depends on 
your own decisions and on the decisions of the other participants. 
Altogether, there are 18 subjects participating in this session. 9 subjects decide as type 
A and 9 subjects decide as type B. If you decide as type A or as type B was decided by the 
random draw of the seat. During the whole experiment you are of type [Type A: A][Type 
B:B] 
The experiment lasts 9 periods. In each period, one type A player interacts with one 
type B player. During the 9 periods you interact [Reputation: always with the same 
participant.] [Experience: with no participant a second time.] 
 
Order of play 
At the beginning of each round one of the intervals [10.01,15.00], [15.01,20.00], 
[20.01,25.00], [25.01,30.00] will be drawn. The value of the good will be drawn from the 
selected interval.  All values in this interval are equally likely to occur. Thus, the value of the 
good can be in the range of 10.01 to 30.00 Taler.  
A receives the information of the selected interval. B does not receive this 
information.  
A then gives an advice about the value of the good to B. The advice will contain a 
number in the interval 10.01 to 30.00 Taler. 
B receives the advice from A. B is supposed to provide an estimation of the value of 
the good. The estimate consists of a number in the interval 10.01 to 30.00 Taler.  
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Meanwhile A answers the following question: What is your expectation of B’s 
estimate?  
When finished, A and B will receive feedback on the value of the good and their own 
payoff. [Disclosure: and the payoff of the other player.]  
 
Payoff 
Each subject receives a show-up fee of 2.50 Euro. The show-up fee does not depend 
on the decisions during the experiment.  
At the end of the experiment the computer will draw one of the 9 rounds randomly. 
This round will be paid off for all subjects in this session. Amounts during the experiment 
will be displayed  in “Taler“. The payoff in the selected round will be converted in € and paid 
out in cash. One  Taler will be converted in 3 €.   
[Disclosure type A and type B, No-Disclosure type A: The payoff of A depends on 
B’s estimate of the value of the good. In case the estimate is higher than the value of the good, 
A’s payoff is the difference between B’s estimate and the value of the good. That means that 
for one Taler overestimation of B, type A player will be paid out one Taler. At a maximum A 
receives a payoff of 5 Taler. In case B’s estimate is lower or equal the value of the good the 
payoff of A is 0 Taler.] 
[No Disclosure type B: The calculation of type A’s payoff is not known by the 
participants of type B. Type A participants are informed about this.] 
B’s payoff depends on his own estimation of the value. Is the estimation is exactly the 
value of the good, B receives a payoff of 5 Taler. For one Taler deviation of type B’s 
estimation the payoff of B will decrease of one Taler. It is not important whether the 
estimation is lower or higher than the value of the good. If B deviates 5 or more Taler from 
the value of the good, he receives zero payoff.  
Example. A receives the information that the value of the good is between 25.01 and 
30.00 Taler. A provides B with an advice of 29.00 Taler. B estimates the value of the good at 
28.50 Taler. The value of the good is 26.00 Taler. The payoff of [Disclosure type A and type 
B, No disclosure type A: A is 2.50 Taler and] of B is 2.50 Taler. 
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In the case that the period described above will be selected for payoff, both subjects 
will receive at the end of the experiment 2.50 Euro show-up fee and 3 x 2.50 Taler = 7.50 
Euro from the period, altogether 10 Euro. 
 
Control questions 
The following questions should test whether you have understood the rules mentioned 
above. Please answer the questions carefully. Before starting the experiment, we will check 
whether you have answered the questions correctly.  
Question 1. Imagine the following situation: 
A receives the information that the value is between 20.01 and 25.00 Taler. 
A gives B the advice that the value of the good is 24.00 Taler.  
B estimates that the value of the good is 23.00 Taler. 
The true value of the good is 23.00 Taler.  
What is A’s and B’s payoff? 
[Disclosure type A and B, No Disclosure type A: A receives _Taler] B receives _Taler 
Question 2. Imagine the following situation: 
A receives the information that the value is between 15.01 and 20.00 Taler. 
A gives B the advice that the value of the good is 28.00 Taler.  
B estimates that the value of the good is 17.00 Taler. 
The true value of the good is 20.00 Taler.  
What is A’s and B’s payoff? 
[Disclosure type A and B, No Disclosure type A: A receives _Taler] B receives _Taler 
Question 3. Imagine the following situation: 
A receives the information that the value is between 10.01 and 15.00 Taler. 
A gives B the advice that the value of the good is 12.00 Taler.  
B estimates that the value of the good is 25.50 Taler. 
The true value of the good is 11.50 Taler.  
What is A’s and B’s payoff? 
[Disclosure type A and B, No Disclosure type A: A receives _Taler] B receives _Taler 
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Appendix B: Not for publication 
 
Figure 8 
Correlation of auditors' advice and investors’ estimates, square root function fitted 
 
 Disclosure (Experience condition) No Disclosure (Experience condition)
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Disclosure (Reputation condition) No Disclosure (Reputation condition) 
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Table 3a 
Descriptive and test statistics for advice and estimates, 1st-9th period 
 
 
 
  
  Disclosure 
mean (SD) 
No disclosure 
mean (SD) 
Advice 25.01 (2.78) 26.21 (2.23) 
Advice bias 4.46 (3.60) 5.90 (2.71) 
Auditor  
(n=18) 
Exp. estimate 21.96 (2.56) 23.28 (2.10) 
Estimate 19.72 (2.50) 22.72 (2.13) 
Estimate bias -0.84 (2.05) 2.41 (2.21) 
Experience: 
1st-9th period 
perfect stranger 
matching Investor 
(n=18) 
Estimate error 5.64 (1.04) 5.99 (1.17) 
Advice 24.21 (3.56) 23.58 (2.79) 
Advice bias 3.60 (3.76) 3.89 (2.12) 
Auditor  
(n=18-
20)  Exp. estimate 20.89 (1.91) 21.88 (2.33) 
Estimate 19.76 (2.20) 21.72 (2.44) 
Estimate bias -0.84 (2.29) 2.03 (1.70) 
Reputation:  
1st-9th period 
partner 
matching 
 
Investor 
(n=18-
20) Estimate error 5.86 (1.46) 3.76 (1.40) 
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Table 3b 
Descriptive and test statistics for advice and estimates, 2nd-9th period 
 
 
 
  
  Disclosure 
mean (st. d.) 
No disclosure 
mean (st. d.) 
Advice 24.86 (2.93) 26.57 (2.25) 
Advice bias 4.37 (3.96) 6.32 (2.84) 
Auditor  
(n=18) 
Exp. estimate 21.88 (2.82) 23.35 (2.30) 
Estimate 19.70 (2.42) 22.77 (2.29) 
Estimate bias -0.78 (2.09) 2.52 (2.37) 
Experience: 
2nd-9th period 
perfect stranger 
matching Investor 
(n=18) 
Estimate error 5.78 (1.32) 6.08 (1.26) 
Advice 24.46 (3.44) 23.80 (2.84) 
Advice bias 3.80 (3.92) 4.18 (2.03) 
Auditor  
(n=18-
20)  Exp. estimate 20.92 (2.13) 21.85 (2.43) 
Estimate 19.72 (2.19) 21.77 (2.56) 
Estimate bias -0.94 (2.41) 2.15 (1.66) 
Reputation:  
2nd-9th period 
partner 
matching 
 
Investor 
(n=18-
20) Estimate error 6.11 (1.55) 3.82 (1.32) 
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